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Introduction 
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the 
manager rather of other people's money than their own, it cannot well 
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigi-
lance with which the partners in a private copartner frequently watch 
over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to con-
sider attention to small matters as not for their master's honor, and 
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence 
and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company. 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
The literature on corporate takeovers has focused primarily on 
shortcomings of the managements of target companies-who sup-
posedly care more for their own interests than those of the 
shareholders-as the motivation for corporate acquisition; the 
accompanying run-up in the price of the target's stock is viewed as 
confirming evidence of the benefits to shareholders that will arise 
from efficiencies introduced by new management. 1 We believe that 
this analysis is incomplete and that misleading conclusions may be 
drawn from it. 
The prevailing literature downplays the fact that the same poten-
tials for conflicts of interest between target shareholders and their 
managements exist between acquiring firm shareholders and their 
managements. To the extent that manager remuneration, prestige, 
and general perquisites are a positive function of firm size, takeovers 
represent means by which management may act on this conflict of 
interest. Hence, management self-interest in the acquiring firms is an 
alternative motivation for corporate acquisition. Contrary to prevail-
ing theory, the market for corporate control may not provide effec-
tive policing of manager abuses, especially in the short run. The 
empirical evidence on this point is quite clear, as we will see. 
In our view, the issue of the justifiability of merger activity is mis-
placed. Negative wealth effects to acquiring firm shareholders can 
Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished Professor and director of the 
Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis; he 
is also a member of several corporate boards. Stephen Vogt is John M. Olin Fellow 
at the Center. 
©1987, by the Regents of the University of California. Reprinted from the Califor-
nia Management Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 by permission of the Regents. 
occur even in a properly functioning market for corporate control. 
Winners and losers exist and the data are specific as to who they are. 
This highlights the fact that simply advocating a free market for cor-
porate control is not sufficient to protect the interests of sharehold-
ers. What is required is a stronger set of internal checks on the 
agency relationship governing the responsibility of management. In 
particular, corporate boards that are more responsive to the concerns 
of the shareholders are needed to serve as healthy counterweights to 
the actions of management. 
Background 
Implicit in most academic studies of changes in corporate control 
is the notion that internal monitoring of management is ineffective in 
protecting the interests of the shareholders. Because of the difficul-
ties involved in day-to-day oversight, firms have the incentive to 
devote part of their resources to enhance management prerogatives 
rather than profit maximization. Hence, they will not be operating 
efficiently. This situation will be reflected in a low evaluation of the 
company's stock in the market for securities. 
Under such circumstances, it has been suggested that the market 
for corporate control can act as an external check on management. 2 
Undervalued shares invite takeover attempts as outsiders realize the 
gains to be made by expelling inefficient, entrenched management. 
Replacing those managers with executives more willing to seek a 
profit-maximizing strategy will presumably improve the valuation of 
the firm's shares in the market. In this view, corporate takeovers pro-
vide economic gains. In efficient capital markets, the resultant 
increased profitability implies enhanced shareholder wealth. Indeed, 
a large number of "event" studies confirm the usual pattern of 
increases in stock market evaluations of firms that are targeted for 
takeover. 3 
Typically, the shareholder gains from an acquisition are estimated 
by comparing the "abnormal" returns to the shareholder arising 
from the acquisition and the normal returns from ownership of the 
stock. A fairly standard and sophisticated methodology has been 
developed for this purpose (based on the well-known capital asset 
pricing model). We do not quarrel with that approach for the pur-
poses of this study. In fact, we rely upon it in the section that follows. 
However, we do need to acknowledge the presence of a few studies 
that report contrary results; that is, they show that frequently com-
panies and their stock values perform more poorly after takeovers. 4 
2 
The Returns to Acquiring Firms 
As noted earlier, the empirical studies of corporate takeovers focus 
on the benefits to the shareholders of the target companies. Never-
theless, a substantial body of data exists on the effects of takeovers 
on the shareholders of the acquiring firms. In fact, both sets of data 
typically are taken from the same studies, using the same methodol-
ogy. However, the data on the acquiring firms provide some interest-
ing variation from the dominant theme in the literature which finds 
takeovers generally improving the performance of the business sec-
tor. 
Table 1 presents a survey of ten takeover studies which report 
cumulative average abnormal returns to acquiring firm shareholders 
over three separate event periods. Virtually all studies report positive 
abnormal returns to acquiring firms in the weeks or months prior to 
the actual announcement of the merger. This is the factual basis from 
which the prevailing literature concludes that shareholders of the 
acquiring firm benefit from mergers. 
But that is not the end of the story. Only two of the studies show 
significantly positive returns around the date of the announcement; 
four report insignificant gains or losses during that limited time per-
iod, and three report significant decreases in the returns to bidding 
companies. Of even greater interest is the fact that nine of the ten 
studies go on to report losses in shareholder returns during the period 
following the announcement of the merger. 
Using the same theoretical framework as the prevailing literature 
employs for analyzing the effects on target firms, we are led to the 
conclusion that the significant negative cumulative abnormal returns 
due to acquisition indicate that the acquisitions are, on average, a 
poor investment for acquiring firms. Parallel to the concern about 
the shortcomings of target managements, the negative returns indi-
cate the ability of managements of the acquiring firms to act in their 
own behalf and not in the shareholders' best interests. 5 
Of course, these results have puzzled those sympathetic to the view 
that takeovers create wealth. Inevitably, the statistical methodology 
has been challenged. Specifically, the notion of measuring cumula-
tive abnormal returns around the event date has been criticized 
because returns will be influenced by the size of the firm involved in 
the acquisition. Since most acquisitions involve a larger firm acquir-
ing a smaller one, the measured returns to the bidding firm will be 
biased downward simply due to the size factor. This concern can be 
3 
Table 1. Average Abnormal Returns to Acquiring Firms 
[Periods are reported relative to announcement date (0)] 
Study 
Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns 
(in percent) 
Asquith (1983) Preannouncement period (- 480 to - 20 days) 14.3117o* 
Announcement date (0 days) 0.2 
Post-announcement period (1 to 240 days) -7.2* 
Asquith et. al. Preannouncement period (- 20 to 0 days) 2.8* 
(1983) Announcement date (0 days) .;:. 0.9* 
Post-announcement period (1 to 20 days) -0.2 
Dodd (1980) 1 Preannouncement period (- 40 to 0 days) 5.37* 
Announcment date (0 days) -0.62* 
Post-announcement period (0 to 40 days) -0.2 
Dodd and Preannouncement period ( -12 to -1 months) 11.66* 
Ruback (1977) Announcement date (- 1 to 1 month) 2.83* 
Post-announcement period (1 to 12 months) -1.32 
Eger (1983) Preannouncement period n.a. 
Announcement date (- 5 to 10 days) -4.0* 
Post-announcement period (0 to 20 days) -3.1 * 
Firth ( 1980)2 Preannouncement period (- 12 to -2 months) -0.3 
( -1 month) -0.1 
Announcement date (0 months) -6.3* 
Post-announcement period (1 to 12 months) 0.5 
Langetieg Preannouncement period (- 6 to -1 months) -2.25* 
(1978)3 Announcement date (0 months) n.a. 
Post-announcement period (1 to 12 months) - 6.25* 
Malatesta Preannouncement period (- 60 to 0 months) 4.3* 
(1983) Announcement date (0 months) 0.9* 
Post-announcement period (1 to 6 months) -5.4* 
(7 to 12 months) -2.2* 
Mandelker Preannouncement period (- 40 to 1 months) 4.9* 
(1974) Announcement date (- 1 to 0 months) 0.18 
Post-announcement period (0 to 40 months) -1.5 
Mueller and Preannouncement period n.a. 
Magenheim Announcement date (0 months) 0.28 
(1984) Post-announcement period (- 3 to 36 months) -42.2* 
1Dodd also reports returns around first public announcement of subsequently com-
pleted mergers. The are -1.09%, - .29%, and -7.22% for the preannouncement, 
announcement, and post-announcement dates respectively. 
2Covers U.K. firms. 
3Presents results from four different performance measures. Results reported here 
reflect an average of all four measures. 
*Indicates statistically significant results. 
Source: See Bibliography 
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remedied by estimated abnormal dollar returns rather than abnormal 
returns per share. Table 2 presents the studies that have been pre-
pared on this aggregate basis. 
The results are not very different. Only one study shows evidence 
of positive dollar gains to shareholders of acquiring firms, while the 
other four have negative returns. Several writers have attempted to 
explain away the negative findings. Some suggest that the tendency 
for the lack of positive changes in acquiring firm stock value is 
related to the fact that the market capitalizes the gains to acquiring 
firms at the time they announce a takeover program. 6 Hence individ-
ual acquisition announcements have little stock market effect 
because they have already been discounted. Other explanations, such 
as inefficiencies in the market itself, are quickly dismissed. 7 As for 
the statistical methods used, whatever shortcomings they possess are 
nevertheless enthusiastically embraced when they show gains to tar-
get shareholders. 
Net Wealth Effects of Corporate Acquisitions 
Evidence of negative returns to acquiring firm shareholders raises 
the question of the direction of aggregate wealth effects in the 
takeover process. From a policy perspective, the combined gain or 
loss to shareholders of target and acquiring firms is the relevant 
number on which to focus. The net return identifies if takeovers, on 
average, create or reduce social (aggregate) wealth while abstracting 
from distributional effects of the process. 
A difficulty that arises in the determination of the overall wealth 
effects of corporate acquisitions (i.e., returns to acquiring firm 
shareholders plus returns to target firms) is that most studies use 
average abnormal "rates of return" of the respective firms in ques-
tion. Comparing returns to acquiring firms and target firms is mean-
ingless since such a comparison says nothing about the aggregated 
wealth effects of the merger. For example, a target firm may incur a 
positive abnormal return of 200Jo and the acquiring firm only a 50Jo 
negative abnormal return. Yet, if the acquiring firm is sufficiently 
large (i.e., has a much larger amount of outstanding shares), the 
total dollar return of the transaction may be negative. 
It is interesting to note that while this aggregate dollar return is the 
key number with which policy makers are concerned, very few stud-
ies report it and instead concentrate on the "rate of return" 
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Table 2. Average Abnormal Dollar Returns to Acquiring Firms 
Study In Millions 
Bradley Desai and Kim (1982) 1 Period (- 20 to 5 days) -$17 
(162 tender offers) 
Bradley Desai and Kim (1983) 1 Period (- 20 to 5 days) +$6 
(698 tender offers) 
Firth (1980) Period ( -1 to 0 months) -$1,140 
(434 takeovers) 
Malatesta (1983) Period (- 60 to 0 months) -$111 
(256 mergers) 
Varaiya (1985) 1 Period (- 60 to 60 days) -$129 
1See Richard Roll, "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers:' Jour-
nal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 2 (April 1986): 203. 
Source: See Bibliography. 
approach. We have found only six studies that report total wealth 
effects of corporate takeovers. These are reported in Table 3. 
The results are mixed. One study (Firth, 1980) presents evidence of 
aggregate wealth losses.8 Another (Halpern, 1973) suggests aggregate 
wealth gains, while the remainder do not differ statistically from 
zero. 9 From this limited evidence, it appears that the total wealth 
effects to society are approximately zero. Clearly, the data do not 
support the notion that owners of acquiring firms generally benefit 
from takeovers. The available evidence of aggregate returns further 
suggests that acquiring firm losses on average are large enough to 
completely offset the gains made by owners of target firms. 
The next section introduces an alternative view of corporate acqui-
sitions. We suggest that, in a market for corporate control where 
transactions costs are present, the managements of the acquiring 
firms can pursue acquisition strategies that satisfy their individual 
interests at the expense of their shareholders. 
6 
Table 3. Average Aggregate Abnormal Dollar Returns 
(Acquiring Firm Plus Target Firm Dollar Returns) 
Study In Millions 
Bradley Desai and Kim (1982)1 Period (- 20 to 5 days) -$17.0 
Bradley Desai and Kim (1983)1 Period (- 20 to 5 days) + $33.9 
Firth ( 1980) Period (- 1 to 0 months) - $36.6* 
Halpern (1973) Period ( -7 to 0 months) + $27.35* 
Malatesta (1983) Period (- 60 to 0 months) +$0.29 
Varaiya (1985)1 Period (- 60 to 60 days) + $60.7 
1See Richard Roll, "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers:' Jour-
nal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 2 (April 1986): 203. 
*Indicates statistical significance. 
Source: See Bibliography. 
Management Self-Interest 
as an Incentive for Acquisition 
The existence of negative returns to shareholders of acquiring 
firms suggests that acquisitions do not reflect a profit maximization 
strategy on the part of the managements of the acquiring firms. If 
shareholder interest (i.e. profit maximization) is not the motivating 
factor for takeovers, then it must be the case that management self-
interest is. The same incentive differentials which encourage man-
agers to appropriate the firm's resources for their own benefit can 
also be the driving force behind corporate acquisitions. 
Through takeovers, acquiring firm managers can create new 
potentials for exploiting the manager-shareholder relationship. By 
creating larger, more diverse corporations, managers increase the 
shareholders' cost and complexity of monitoring. Furthermore, if 
the managers' proportion of equity in the new, larger firm falls, that 
lowers the cost to management of deviating from a profit-maximizing 
strategy. The result of acquisition is that management can extract 
more of the firm's resources for itself. 
The ability of managers to pursue their own self-interest results 
from the nature of the corporate structure (that is a variation of the 
7 
point made by Adam Smith in the opening quotation). Managers 
have two key roles within the firm. First, they have been hired (with 
compensation) by the shareholders to apply their particular skills 
toward managing the firm's assets. Secondly, managers are often 
shareholders and like other owners are concerned with the value of 
their shares. Managers who own only small fractions of the out-
standing equity and reduce that fraction further through acquisition 
can appropriate more of the corporate resources in the form of 
"rents" without paying the full cost of doing so. 
One team of researchers has confirmed this hypothesis with regard 
to acquisitions. A study of 191 acquiring companies during the per-
iod 1963-1981 found a positive relationship between abnormal stock 
returns from mergers and the percentage of the acquiring firm's 
shares held by management. 10 This positive relationship supports the 
hypothesis that the lower the percentage of share ownership by the 
manager, the greater the incentive to undertake acquisitions that may 
not be in the shareholders' best interest. 
The market for corporate control can correct this inefficient use of 
resources through counter-acquisition. Assuming no market imper-
fections, another firm (or individual) can acquire the management-
dominated firm, pursue the appropriate profit-maximizing strategy, 
and reap the benefits of increased value. The gain in doing this must 
be distributed between management and the shareholders of both the 
acquiring and target firms. 
Alternatively, if imperfections such as significant transaction costs 
of acquisitions are present, the cost of counter-acquisition may out-
weigh its payoffs, and the market provides no effective incentive to 
correct the situation. One researcher showed that transaction costs 
limited tender offers until share values fell at least 13 percent. 11 This 
finding supports the possibility of negative returns to acquiring firm 
shareholders. While the potential for pursuit of management self-
interest exists, the next section considers the actuality of it occurring. 
The Incentives to Acquire 
The "rents" received by management can be broadly classified 
into two groups. The first has been called nonpecuniary benefits. 
These are the somewhat intangible and difficult to measure benefits 
derived from controlling a larger group of corporate assets. Exam-
ples of these were mentioned earlier: increased economic or political 
8 
power and prestige, greater job satisfaction, etc. 
The second type of rent is the pecuniary remuneration received as 
a result of managing larger amounts of corporate assets. These more 
easily measured rents come in the form of salaries, bonuses, 
restricted stock plans, and stock option plans. 
Trying to measure nonpecuniary rents is problematic since no real 
standard of measurement exists. Consequently, casual observation 
presents the only alternative. Certainly, the common perception is 
that larger and better perquisites are available to those who control a 
greater amount of corporate assets. If one is willing to accept this 
presumption as true-and substantial anecdotal evidence is 
available-corporate acquisition is an effective method of increasing 
the quantity of corporate assets over which management has discre-
tion. 
One particular form of nonpecuniary rent studied in the literature 
views corporate acquisition as a method of diversifying managers' 
"employment risk" (i.e., the risk of losing their jobs, professional 
reputations, and employment perquisites). 12 Since manager remuner-
ation and other perquisites are tied to firm activity, the manager's 
employment risk is closely related to the firm's risk. While share-
holders can diversify their portion of firm risk by holding a broad 
portfolio of capital assets, managers heavily endowed in firm-
specific (i.e., non-tradeable) human capital are not able to do so. If 
managers are risk averse, they will attempt to diversify by some other 
means. One such method is to undertake corporate acquisition to 
broaden the firm's market and stabilize its income stream. Mergers 
having these characteristics may be viewed as a particular form of 
management perquisite intended to decrease the risk associated with 
the manager's human capital. 
This hypothesis suggests that firms more heavily controlled by 
managers are more likely to be involved in acquisitions as managers 
seek to impose their risk-reducing preferences on the corporate struc-
ture. The data appear to bear this point out. A study of acquisitions 
between 1961 and 1970 found that, on average, firms with weak 
owner control made twice as many acquisitions as those with strong 
owner control. 13 
Measuring monetary compensation is considerably easier. A vari-
ety of scholars has suggested that managerial compensation is 
directly proportional to firm size. 14 Maximizing the growth of the 
firm becomes the dominant strategy of the self-interested manager. 
The data contained in a recent study by the Conference Board sup-
port this suggestion. Using the Board's data, Figure 1 shows the rela-
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tionship between total compensation of Chief Executive Officers and 
total sales as a proxy for company size. 15 The chart clearly indicates 
that managerial remuneration rises with firm size. While other fac-
tors contribute to a CEO's salary and bonuses, the Conference Board 
reports that approximately half of the variation in CEO pay is statis-
tically explained by variations in company size. 
The Conference Board also notes that, among industries providing 
sufficient data to analyze (namely, manufacturing, banks, insurance 
companies, and retailers), bonus awards tend to be a larger percent-
age of salary the larger the size of the company. 16 The results reported 
by the Conference Board are hardly an aberration. The fact that 
managers generally benefit from increased firm size has been well 
documented in earlier academic studies. 17 
One scholar has directly examined the hypothesis that corporate 
acquisition is an effective means of increasing managerial compensa-
tion. A study of 355 successful United Kingdom takeovers found the 
average increase in managerial remuneration from acquisition to be 
33 percent. The average increase for managers of firms not involved 
in acquisitions during the same period was approximately 20 percent. 
This indicates that, at least in that large sample of changes in corpo-
rate control, acquisitions benefited acquiring firm managers substan-
tially. Meanwhile, the shareholders of these firms were losing over 1 
billion pounds sterling. 18 
The evidence appears clear. The normal operation of the market 
for corporate control allows potential for pursuit of self-interest on 
the part of acquiring firm management. Furthermore, the benefits to 
managers from increases in firm size do exist. Finally, management is 
indeed acting on the incentives provided. 
The Need for Stronger Internal Monitoring 
Shareholders have an alternative method of controlling manager 
behavior. Regardless of the limited ability of the market for corpo-
rate control to police manager activity, shareholders can always 
reject a reduction in wealth by voting as a group to disapprove the 
merger. 
Several explanations have been put forth as to why shareholders 
may approve actions that are detrimental to their interests. 19 The 
most compelling is that information and transaction costs required 
to reject the action may at times be sufficiently large to rule out 
effective opposition. 
11 
Managers may also have an advantage in a merger situation. Even 
though share prices had fallen upon announcement, they may con-
vince shareholders either explicitly or implicitly that they have special 
information that the market has not taken into account. To the 
extent that shareholders trust management, they will be more likely 
to rubber stamp the decision. 
This serves to highlight the role of the corporate board of direc-
tors. The board has a fiduciary responsibility to act in the best interest 
of the shareholders they represent. Since transaction costs in the mar-
ket for corporate control and high information costs to shareholders 
limit the extent to which they can monitor management activities, the 
board of directors assumes the responsibility of doing so. 
Conclusions and Policy Suggestions 
We conclude that, based on historical data, negative returns to 
shareholders from acquisitions are more prevalent than the prevail-
ing folklore on the subject admits. Clearly, there are winners and 
losers in the takeover game. Most studies confirm that, in general, 
target firm shareholders are winners. The evidence presented here 
indicates that, on average, acquiring firm shareholders are not as 
fortunate. At best, these shareholders are no worse off, but often 
they lose during acquisitions. 
Furthermore, while the acquiring firm shareholders are losing 
overall, the individuals they have hired to manage their assets are 
benefiting from their loss. Takeover promoters are not the champions 
of the small shareholder, as so often claimed. Rather, it is intriguing 
to note that they promote the interests of a select group of sharehold-
ers to which they have no obligation, at the same time neglecting 
those whom they were hired to serve. 
Despite this rather gloomy reexamination of the takeover process, 
we refrain from suggesting additional government regulation as a 
solution to managerial abuses. The history of government regulation 
of business in the United States hardly supports the case for expand-
ing the role of the public sector in private sector decision making. 
The market for takeovers is too complex to permit a regulatory body 
or statute to effectively sort out acquisitions that produce only wealth 
gains. Moreover, a free market for corporate control is necessary for 
the maintenance of an efficient and dynamic corporate sector. Yet, 
such a market is not free from imperfections. 
12 
The appropriate response to corporate acquisition requires 
stronger internal checks on the management of acquiring firms. 
There are many ways to accomplish this objective. One involves tying 
manager remuneration more closely to share price performance 
(e.g., stock option plans and larger managerial share holdings). 
Other approaches include increasing the accuracy and clarity of 
financial reporting, and generally strengthening shareholders ability 
to oversee large investment decisions. More fundamental is the 
responsibility for oversight of management which is lodged in the 
corporate board of directors. A more assertive board willing to take 
a stand against actions not in the best interest of the shareholders 
they represent will also ensure stronger internal checks on manage-
ment. 
The increasing frequency of legal challenges to board decisions 
makes it more likely that board members, especially independent out-
side directors, will change their customary approach of supporting the 
management's proposals for investments and acquisitions, as well as 
other matters. Rather than automatically deferring to management 
(which at times may subject them to expensive shareholder suits), 
board members in the future may be focusing more attention on the 
desires of the owners of the firm, whom they legally represent. 
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